Predictive coding and multisensory integration: an attentional account of the multisensory mind by Durk Talsma
REVIEW
published: 26 March 2015
doi: 10.3389/fnint.2015.00019
Edited by:
Salvador Soto-Faraco,
Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Spain
Reviewed by:
John S. Butler,
Trinity College Dublin, Ireland
Manuel R. Mercier,
Albert Einstein College of Medicine of
Yeshiva University, USA
*Correspondence:
Durk Talsma,
Department of Experimental
Psychology, Ghent University, Henri
Dunantlaan 2, B-9000 Ghent,
Belgium durk.talsma@UGent.be
Received: 24 November 2014
Paper pending published:
27 January 2015
Accepted: 03 March 2015
Published: 26 March 2015
Citation:
Talsma D (2015) Predictive coding
and multisensory integration: an
attentional account of the
multisensory mind.
Front. Integr. Neurosci. 9:19.
doi: 10.3389/fnint.2015.00019
Predictive coding and multisensory
integration: an attentional account of
the multisensory mind
Durk Talsma*
Department of Experimental Psychology, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium
Multisensory integration involves a host of different cognitive processes, occurring
at different stages of sensory processing. Here I argue that, despite recent insights
suggesting that multisensory interactions can occur at very early latencies, the actual
integration of individual sensory traces into an internally consistent mental representation
is dependent on both top–down and bottom–up processes. Moreover, I argue that this
integration is not limited to just sensory inputs, but that internal cognitive processes
also shape the resulting mental representation. Studies showing that memory recall
is affected by the initial multisensory context in which the stimuli were presented
will be discussed, as well as several studies showing that mental imagery can affect
multisensory illusions. This empirical evidence will be discussed from a predictive coding
perspective, in which a central top–down attentional process is proposed to play a
central role in coordinating the integration of all these inputs into a coherent mental
representation.
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An Attentional Account of the Multisensory Mind
Imagine watching a rerun of the famous TV-series the Muppet Show. One popular character, the
Swedish chef, is known for its gibberish fake Swedish, which at ﬁrst appears not to make sense
at all, other than its comical eﬀect. Yet by carefully watching the Muppet’s mouth movements
and the various additional cues given by bodily motions, it becomes suddenly clear that the fake
Swedish is actually garbled English. As you watch the end of the clip, you can clearly understand the
phrase “The chicken is in the basket” as the chef throws poor Camilla the hen through a basketball
ring. Imagine now continuing with a diﬀerent episode, and you may instantly recognize the chef ’s
response “The dog is in the pot,” in response to Miss Piggy’s query “what happened to my dog Foo
Foo.”
This example clearly illustrates a major problem that we humans regularly have to overcome
in interpreting sensory information, namely resolving ambiguities. Our understandability of the
chef ’s garbled fake Swedish is greatly enhanced through several non-verbal cues. These cues involve
direct visual cues, such as the mouth movements accompanying his speech and several other visual
cues that provide the appropriate context for understanding the scene. In addition, memory cues
that are based on previous experience with similar scenes may also help us in our interpretation.
But exactly how do we manage to integrate all these cues?
To answer this, the discipline ofMultisensory Processing investigates the mechanisms contribut-
ing to the combining of information from our various senses. According to Stein et al. (2010),
Multisensory Integration, refers to the neural process by which unisensory signals are combined
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to form a new product or representation. While multisensory
processing studies have greatly increased our understanding of
the processes directly involved in combining information from
multiple senses, it is still not quite clear how our interpretation of
sensory information can be enhanced by other sources of infor-
mation, such as our existing background knowledge based on
prior experience. In this review, I aim to discuss how these cues
might be integrated with ongoing sensory input to generate a
consistent mental representation.
Multisensory Integration: Top–Down
and Bottom–Up Processing
Our understanding of brain function has increased sharply in the
last 20 years or so. In multisensory processing research we have
equally witnessed a rather dramatic shift in our understanding
of the processes that combine information across the individual
senses. Before the seminal single cell recording studies in ani-
mals that demonstrated the existence of multisensory neurons in
the superior colliculus (Wallace et al., 1998; Wallace and Stein,
2001), a predominant view in the late 1980s and early 1990s was
that multisensory integration takes place relatively late in the pro-
cessing stream, in cortical areas known as secondary association
areas. For instance, in their inﬂuential late 1980s textbook “Brain,
Mind, and Behavior,” neuroscientists Floyd E. Bloom and Arlyne
Lazeron, write:
“Association areas in the parietal lobe, for example, are thought
to synthesize information from the somatosensory cortex–messages
from the skin, muscles, tendons, and joints about the body’s position
and movement–with information about sight and sound trans-
mitted from the visual and auditory cortices in the occipital and
temporal lobes. This integrated information helps us to form an
accurate sense of our physical selves as we move through our
environment.” (Bloom and Lazeron, 1988, pp. 274–275).
Bloom and Lazeron’s (1988) description clearly indicates that
the merging of information across the senses was supposed to
take place after the initial sensory processing had come to com-
pletion (see Figure 1). Since that time, however, many discoveries
have suggested that multisensory integration is more complex
than this. For example, in addition to the aforementioned single
cell recordings, electrophysiological studies showed that multi-
sensory interactions can already take place as early as 40 ms
after stimulus presentation, which is considerably earlier than ini-
tially thought possible (Giard and Péronnet, 1999; Molholm et al.,
2002).
A Predictive Coding Account
One inﬂuential framework to explain the intricacies of multisen-
sory processing is that of predictive coding. The predictive coding
framework states that the brain produces a Bayesian estimate of
the environment (Friston, 2010). According to this view, stochas-
tic models of the environment exist somewhere in the brain1,
1Given that the predictive coding framework essentially describes a hierarchy of
processing levels, it does not identify speciﬁcally which brain areas are involved in
FIGURE 1 | A classical view of multisensory integration. According to
this view, visual and auditory signals were first analyzed in the respective
sensory cortices, before they were integrated in the secondary association
areas, located in the temporo-parietal areas between the auditory and visual
cortices.
which are updated on the basis of processed sensory information.
These stochastic models (see Klemen and Chambers, 2011 for a
review) thus provide the brain areas lower in the sensory pro-
cessing hierarchy with predictions (or in Bayesian terms “priors”)
that can be used to adjust the processing of ongoing sensory
input. A strong mismatch between the prediction and the actual
sensory input will then result in a major update of the internal
model. For example, when unexpected sensory input is present,
our internal model may require updating to deal with this change
in representations.
Predictive Coding: Top–Down vs.
Bottom–Up Processing
The aforementioned mismatch is a typical example of bottom–
up processing, in which sensory input adjusts the internal model.
Conversely, our internal model may also aﬀect the processing
of our sensory information. This type of processing is known as
top–down and is closely related to selective attention. For exam-
ple, when we are in a complex environment with many stimuli
creating these internal models. In general, the higher the level of processing, the
more distributed the network of brain areas involved can become. For instance,
Rao and Ballard (1999) presented a predictive coding model of receptive ﬁeld
eﬀects in striate cortex and stated that, in their simulations, the “internal model
is encoded in a distributed manner within the synapses of model neurons at each
level.” Although it is not yet understood how stochastic models of the environment
are coded in the brain, seminal work by Tolman (1948) has shown that cognitive
maps can be formed on the basis of relations among salient cues and that these
representations support navigation and inferential expression. Subsequently, these
maps have been linked to hippocampal functions (see e.g., Morris et al., 1982). The
hippocampal and prefrontal cortex interact with each other in decision making
(Yu and Frank, 2015). The prefrontal cortex is thought to contain a hierarchical
structure of mental representations (Badre, 2008), which in turn are connected
to the parietal cortex. This network bears some resemblance to the network of
brain areas involved in selective attention (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002) and could
jointly support the formation of higher-order stochastic models. This conjecture is
speculative, however, and further research in this area is needed.
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competing for processing capacity, the most relevant ones need to
be prioritized. This is possibly accomplished because the higher-
order brain areas that are part of a fronto-parietal network can
selectively bias the processing in the lower-order perceptual ones
(Corbetta and Shulman, 2002). In other words, attending to task-
relevant stimuli might be necessary for them to gain a stronger
representation in our neural system.
Viewed within context of the predictive coding framework, the
internal representation of our external environment is constantly
updated on the basis of sensory input (i.e., forward connections).
Sensory processing is, in turn, modulated on the basis of pre-
dictions provided by the active representations (i.e., backward
connections). It can thus be argued that backward connections
from the higher-order to the lower-order brain areas might
embody the causal structure of the external world while forward
connections only provide feedback about prediction errors to
higher areas. In other words, anatomical forward connections are
functional feedback connections, and vice versa (Friston, 2005).
Mismatches, or –more formally, prediction errors–will thus result
in strong adjustments in the internal representation and in strong
top–down functional feedforward (or anatomical feedback) sig-
nals. One possible consequence of such a major prediction error
is that the focus of attention shifts to a diﬀerent aspect of the
environment. Seen this way, attention could be considered as a
form of predictive coding; a process that establishes an expecta-
tion of the moments in time when the relevant, to be integrated
stimulus inputs are to arrive (Klemen and Chambers, 2011). It
should be noted, however, that while attention may boost the pre-
cision of the predicted sensory input (and thus contributes to
determining which aspects of our mental representation needs
to be updated) the manifestations of attention and expectation
can be radically opposite. Whereas expectancy reduces the sen-
sory neural responses, attention enhances them, presumably due
to heightening the weighting of the prediction error (Kok et al.,
2011, 2012).
The closely related model of optimal Bayesian integration
(Anastasio et al., 2000; Deneve and Pouget, 2004), has already
been applied to a host of problems related to visual atten-
tion, in which attention is considered to provide the lower level
visual cortices priors that serve to reduce stimulus ambigu-
ity and therefore enhance the visual search process (Chikkerur
et al., 2010). Additionally, it has been successfully applied to
explain a number of basic multisensory processing phenomena
(Ernst and Banks, 2002; Alais and Burr, 2004; Helbig and Ernst,
2007; Holmes, 2009). Despite these applications, the success with
which Bayesian interference models can describe the interaction
between attention and multisensory integration remains yet to be
answered.
Bottom–Up Principles of Multisensory
Integration
Ongoing research that has investigated parts of this interaction
may give us at least a partial answer, however. The informa-
tion contained in the ﬂow of input from the individual senses
to the higher-order brain areas can, at least under certain cir-
cumstances, determine whether the stimuli contained in these
streams are integrated or not. A large number of principles have
been uncovered that explain under which conditions inputs to
diﬀerent modalities interact or not (Stein and Meredith, 1993;
Noesselt et al., 2007; Stein and Stanford, 2008; Stein and Rowland,
2011). These principles were originally strongly related to the
stimulus input characteristics, as well as the individual stimu-
lus processing capabilities of each sensory modality (Stein and
Meredith, 1993). For instance, input into the visual modality may
inﬂuence spatial processing in the auditory modality, while input
to the auditory modality may aﬀect temporal processing in the
visual modality; two characteristics that have been detailed in
the modality appropriate hypothesis (Welch and Warren, 1980;
Vatakis and Spence, 2007). Moreover, spatial and temporal prox-
imity (Lewald and Guski, 2003), or the relative intensity (known
as the “law of inverse eﬀectiveness”; see Holmes, 2009) of multi-
sensory inputs may be critical factors in determining whether two
inputs integrate.
The near-simultaneous stimulation of two or more senses has
also been shown to result in increased fMRI BOLD responses
(Calvert et al., 2000; Fairhall and Macaluso, 2009) in several
brain areas, including the superio-temporal sulcus, superior col-
liculus, and primary visual cortices. Moreover, increased early
latency (∼40 ms after stimulus) event-related potential (ERP)
responses to these stimuli (Giard and Péronnet, 1999; Molholm
et al., 2002), better performance on stimulus identiﬁcation tasks
(Stein et al., 1996), and visual search beneﬁts (Van der Burg
et al., 2008, 2011; Staufenbiel et al., 2011; van den Brink et al.,
2014) have been observed. Butler et al. (2012), used EEG record-
ings and a frequency mismatch paradigm to show that audi-
tory and somatosensory cues elicit a multisensory mismatch,
which indeed suggests that these cues can be combined pre-
attentatively. Similarly Yau et al. (2009) showed that vibrating
somatosensory stimuli for could aﬀect frequency discrimination
of auditory stimuli and vice versa (see also; Yau et al., 2010; Butler
et al., 2011). Interestingly, however, amplitude judgments were
not aﬀected in this fashion. These results show that several stim-
ulus features can automatically inﬂuence the processing of stimuli
presented in another modality.
Bottom–Up Integration Can Drive Attention
Several behavioral and ERP studies have shown that an object
that is simultaneously detected by several sensory systems has
a greater potential for capturing one’s attention (Van der Burg
et al., 2008, 2011; Ngo and Spence, 2010; van den Brink et al.,
2014). For instance, Van der Burg et al. (2008), showed that
equally task irrelevant auditory stimuli could have strong ben-
eﬁcial impact on participants’ ability to detect visual target
stimuli. In this study, a visual search task was used to show
that a visual target stimulus that was not very salient by itself
could become instantly noticeable when it was accompanied
by a short tone. This result, labeled the “Pip and Pop” eﬀect,
suggests that multisensory stimuli are indeed able to capture
attention and therefore that multisensory integration processes
themselves operate pre-attentively. In a subsequent ERP study
(Van der Burg et al., 2011) we showed that an early latency ERP
eﬀect, occurring around 40 ms over posterior scalp areas, cor-
related signiﬁcantly with sound-induced performance beneﬁts
in this task. Moreover, we also found evidence that the sound
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integrated with the visual stimulus in a strongly automatic fash-
ion: whenever a sound was presented, we observed an N2pc
component in the ERP waveform, regardless of whether the cor-
responding visual stimulus was task-relevant or not. Since the
N2pc is generally considered to be a neural correlate of auto-
matic bottom–up attentional deployment (Luck, 1994), this can
be taken as evidence for automatic integration of the sound
with a corresponding visual stimulus. This further suggests that
when a sensory modality is processing a stimulus simultane-
ously with one presented to another modality, these concurrently
presented stimuli have a natural tendency to be processed in
greater depth than stimuli that are either non-concurrent in time.
Thus, these results not only suggest that bottom–up processes
have a major inﬂuence on multisensory processing, they also
show the involvement of early latency unisensory processes in
multisensory integration.
Top–Down Influences on Multisensory
Processing
Interestingly, multisensory integration is not strictly guided by
these principles. For instance Wallace et al. (2004) and Körding
et al. (2007) have shown that even when low-level features of
multisensory stimuli are perfectly matched, behavioral perfor-
mance is impaired when these features are perceived to originate
from two separate sources. Moreover, using vision and touch,
Ernst (2007) trained participants to integrate arbitrary combi-
nations of inputs and found that after training discrimination
thresholds had increased for incongruent haptic/visual stimulus
combinations. Likewise, Fiebelkorn et al. (2011) modulated the
probability of co-occurrence of visual and auditory inputs. They
found that hit rates for near-threshold visual inputs depended not
only on the mere presence of the auditory input, but also on the
participants’ expectation: hit-rates for simultaneously presented
visual stimuli increased speciﬁcally when participants expected
the auditory and visual inputs to be simultaneous. Additionally,
it has been shown that a stimulus presented in one modal-
ity can aﬀect the processing of an accessory stimulus presented
in another modality, either due to its task relevance (Busse
et al., 2005; Donohue et al., 2014), or because of learned asso-
ciations between the individual inputs (Molholm et al., 2007;
Fiebelkorn et al., 2010). For instance, Busse et al. (2005) paired
task-irrelevant auditory stimuli with either attended or unat-
tended visual stimuli and found that processing of the tones
that were paired with attended visual stimuli started to diﬀer
from that of the tones paired with unattended visual stimuli,
around 200 ms after stimulus onset, as expressed by a diﬀer-
ence in the ERP waveforms, suggesting that attentional pro-
cesses in the visual modality strongly aﬀected the processing
of irrelevant stimuli in the auditory modality. This diﬀerence,
which subsequently has been interpreted as a multisensory late
processing negativity (Talsma et al., 2007), was found to orig-
inate in the primary auditory cortex, as shown using fMRI
(Busse et al., 2005; Experiment 2). Thus, these results show that
top–down factors can strongly inﬂuence multisensory process-
ing.
Following the notion that top–down processing inﬂuences
multisensory perception, a profound number of recent studies
has shifted focus from uncovering the aforementioned basic prin-
ciples of multisensory integration, to investigating how these
principles interact with other cognitive processes. For example,
the principle that stimuli are more likely to be integrated when
they overlap in space has been found to be more task-dependent
than originally assumed (Cappe et al., 2012) and the necessity
for temporal correspondence has also been found to depend on
tasks and stimulus type (van Atteveldt et al., 2007; Stevenson
and Wallace, 2013). These recent ﬁndings are somewhat remi-
niscent of earlier work by Lewald and Guski (2003) who have
shown that ones’ belief that two stimuli have a common cause
might aﬀect whether we perceive cross modal inputs as being one
integrated stimulus, or as multiple ones (see also Welch, 1999 for
a similar suggestion). Additionally, processes such as attention
(Tiippana et al., 2004; Alsius et al., 2005, 2007, 2014; Senkowski
et al., 2005, 2007; Talsma and Woldorﬀ, 2005; Talsma et al.,
2007; Mozolic et al., 2008; Hugenschmidt et al., 2009) or mem-
ory (Thelen et al., 2012) have been shown to aﬀect multisensory
processing.
The Multifaceted Interplay between
Attention and Multisensory Processing
Thus, it appears that the automaticity of multisensory integration
depends on a variety of factors: If the individual stimuli in this
bottom–up stream are in themselves salient enough, they can be
integrated; speciﬁcally when they are approximately matched in
time and location with a stimulus processed in another modal-
ity. If they are not salient enough, additional prioritizing by an
attentional mechanism may be needed (Talsma et al., 2010), sug-
gesting that multisensory integration involves both top–down
and bottom–up processes.
If multisensory integration is the result of a complex interac-
tion between top–down and bottom–up processes, then it should
take place at multiple stages of processing. So, are we able to
identify these stages? Several human electrophysiology studies
have shown that multisensory interactions can occur at latencies
that would exclude the possibility that multisensory processing
only occurs after initial sensory analysis has come to comple-
tion (Giard and Péronnet, 1999; Molholm et al., 2002; Van der
Burg et al., 2011). These interactions indicate that informa-
tion from one sensory modality can inﬂuence the information
processing in another one, without necessarily forming a new
mental representation. The aforementioned studies thus indi-
cated that although the primary and secondary (uni-) sensory
brain areas are possibly involved in multisensory processing,
these multisensory processes do not necessarily result in a newly
integrated representation. These studies do suggests, however,
that multisensory processing is intertwined with basic sensory
analysis in amuchmore intimate fashion than previously thought
possible.
To summarize, the ﬁndings discussed above show that multi-
sensory integration depends to a much smaller degree on rigid
bottom–up principles than originally believed to be the case.
By contrast, they show that multisensory integration is by a
very large factor determined by top–down processes. The next
question now is, how these top–down and bottom–up processes
interact, and at which processing stages this occurs.
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Early and Late Accounts of
Multisensory Processing
As has become clear by now, since the beginning of the 1980s,
our understanding of multisensory processing has shifted from
relatively rigid and principle-based mechanisms, located late in
the processing stream, to a highly ﬂexible process consisting of
multiple stages. At least a two sub-processes, one of which can
occur very early on in the processing stream, have been iden-
tiﬁed (Calvert and Thesen, 2004; Talsma et al., 2007; Koelewijn
et al., 2010; Baart et al., 2014). In spite of this change in interpre-
tation, there are still a number of arguments to not completely
discard the original idea that multisensory integration (par-
tially) takes place after the initial sensory processing has come
to completion. It has recently been proposed that the integra-
tion of neural representations is an intrinsic property of the brain
(Ghazanfar and Schroeder, 2006; van Atteveldt et al., 2014). From
this idea it follows that diﬀerent levels of neural interactions
may take place at progressive levels of processing of the sensory
inputs.
Multisensory Integration: An Intrinsic
Property of the Brain?
van Atteveldt et al. (2014), have suggested that multisensory inte-
gration is a process that operates on the basis of the ﬂexible
recruitment of several general purpose brain functions that are
thought to synchronize activation within several neural path-
ways. These pathways are thought to connect the sensory cortices,
either directly to each other (Falchier et al., 2002), or through
cortico-thalamic-cortical pathways (Hackett et al., 2007; Lakatos
et al., 2007; van den Brink et al., 2014), suggesting that infor-
mation can be transferred relatively directly between these brain
areas. Another set of these pathways involves recurrent feed-
back projections from the frontal cortex (notably the frontal eye
ﬁelds and ventral prefrontal cortex). It is assumed that these
feedback mechanisms coordinate activation in the sensory cor-
tices through attention. The general idea is that these recurrent
feedback projections can send biasing signals to the perceptual
brain areas. The feedback signals can then induce an increase in
sensitivity in neurons responsive to the attended feature, while
simultaneously causing a decrease in sensitivity of neurons not
responsive to the attended feature (Motter, 1994; LaBerge, 1995;
Corbetta and Shulman, 2002). This attentional bias can either be
expressed overtly, that is, by actively scanning the environment
with the oculomotor system, or covertly by scanning the envi-
ronment using selective attention only. Given the importance of
these latter recurrent feedback connections, attentive scanning
of the environment is an essential prerequisite for multisensory
integration to take place.
A possible function of the direct and cortico-thalamic con-
nections between visual and auditory cortex is that they enable
cross-referencing between these cortices. In other words, audi-
tory cortex receives advance information regarding visual pro-
cessing and vice versa. Viewed from a predictive coding frame-
work, prediction errors in the auditory representation are mini-
mized by additional information presented by the visual system,
and vice versa. In our own framework (Talsma et al., 2010),
these low level interactions can for instance result in spatio-
temporal realignment of the auditory and visual input signal.
Thus, the early latency processes appear to cross-feed low-level
information between the individual sensory cortices. This cross-
feeding may modify the original input signal and can therefore
be described as a multisensory interaction, but not necessarily
as multisensory integration. Additional research is still required,
however, to determine the exact functional role of these direct
connections.
Task and Stimulus Type Dependencies
Task Relevance
To further diﬀerentiate between early and late multisensory
processes, we need to distinguish between two rather strongly
diﬀering sets of research. Studies using relatively simple stim-
uli, such as beeps, and ﬂashes, have predominantly focused on
determining the bottom–up driven eﬀects of multisensory pro-
cessing that have been discussed in detail above (vanWassenhove
et al., 2007; Stein and Stanford, 2008; Holmes, 2009; Noesselt
et al., 2010; Rach et al., 2011). Studies using more naturalis-
tic, meaningful stimuli, on the other hand, have more strongly
emphasized the inﬂuence of top–down processing in multisen-
sory integration. For instance, studies using speech fragments
andmovie clips have indicated that semantic congruence between
visual and auditory stimuli also strongly inﬂuences multisensory
processing (McGurk and MacDonald, 1976; Calvert et al., 2000;
Tuomainen et al., 2005; Cappe et al., 2012). Most notably, the
McGurk eﬀect, that is, the illusion that speech sounds are being
perceived diﬀerently when they are combined with non-matching
lip-movements is one of the hallmarks of the eﬀectiveness of mul-
tisensory integration. It has long been thought that this illusion is
highly automatic, although that notion has been challenged by
showing that one’s susceptibility to the McGurk illusion falters
under high attentional demands (Alsius et al., 2005).
Top–Down Effect in Multisensory Speech
Perception
The involvement of semantic congruence in multisensory inte-
gration in speech processing presumably indicates that access
to semantic information constrains the possible interpretation
of the bottom–up auditory and visual input streams in a top–
down fashion. In other words, access to prior knowledge may
restrain the possible interpretations of both the visual and audi-
tory input streams, which may in turn improve the segmentation
of the auditory speech signal. Speech signal segmentation is gen-
erally problematic (speciﬁcally under noisy conditions; see Ross
et al., 2007; Foxe et al., 2015), because there is only a very
loose connection between speech sounds and the underlying
phoneme structure (Liberman et al., 1967). Thus, constraining
possible interpretations of the speech signal through top–down
processes may further beneﬁt from limitations imposed by infor-
mation arriving from other modalities. Because of this, speech
perception has been considered to be an intrinsic multisensory
phenomenon (Stevenson et al., 2014) and it has even been argued
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that audio-visual speech perception is a special form of multisen-
sory processing (Tuomainen et al., 2005; but see Vroomen and
Stekelenburg, 2011).
Speech Perception and Prior Experience
Interestingly, Vroomen and Baart (2009) showed that speech
processing can be aﬀected by lip-reading, but only when their
participants could interpret the auditory stimuli as speech signals.
This was done by dubbing sine-wave speech (Remez et al., 1981)
onto video recordings of lip-moments. One interesting character-
istic of sine-wave speech is that to most naïve listeners it sounds
just like random sounds from a science ﬁction movie. Once par-
ticipants get into speech mode, that is, once they start recognizing
the sounds as speech, they usually never fail to ignore the speech
component, much in the way that the realization that the Swedish
Chef from our example speaks garbled English greatly enhances
our comprehension of him. This point thus illustrates that prior
experience and background knowledge may inﬂuence multisen-
sory processing; a topic that will be discussed in more detail
below.
Multiple Stages of Multisensory Integration
Following up on this study, Baart et al. (2014), used ERPs to
identify two distinct stages of multisensory integration in the
processing of sine-wave speech. The auditory N1 component, a
negative component about 100 ms after stimulus onset, peaked
earlier for audiovisual stimuli than for auditory stimuli alone,
regardless of whether participants were in speech mode or not.
By contrast, the P2 component, a positive component peaking
at roughly 200 ms after stimulus onset, was also modulated the
presence of visual information, but only when participants were
in speech mode. It should be noted that the latency of these lat-
ter ERP ﬁndings, while representative for speech stimuli (e.g., van
Wassenhove et al., 2005), occurred somewhat later compared to
those typically found in studies using simple beeps and ﬂashes
(Giard and Péronnet, 1999;Molholm et al., 2002; Senkowski et al.,
2005, 2007; Talsma and Woldorﬀ, 2005; Talsma et al., 2007; Van
der Burg et al., 2011). It appears that the N1 component reﬂects a
relatively automatic bottom–up process, while the P2 component
reﬂects a process that is also aﬀected by top–down process-
ing. Despite this diﬀerence in latency, the notion of a two-stage
approach in multisensory processing is compatible with earlier
notions showing separate stages of multisensory processing for
simple stimuli (Talsma et al., 2007).
Further evidence for the hypothesis that both top–down and
bottom–up processing contribute to multisensory speech pro-
cessing is provided by an fMRI study from Miller and D’Esposito
(2005). These authors presented audiovisual speech fragments
in which the relative onsets of the auditory speech stimulus
were shifted with respect to the onset of the visual stimulus.
Synchronous presentation of the auditory and visual speech sig-
nals resulted in a signiﬁcantly larger activity in several brain areas
that are involved in multisensory processing. These areas include
Heschl’s gyrus, the superior temporal sulcus, the middle intra-
parietal sulcus, and the inferior frontal gyrus. The involvement
of these brain areas provides more evidence that multisensory
interactions occur at various stages of processing.
Top Down Processing: Exclusively for
Speech Stimuli?
The processing of naturalistic audiovisual stimuli involves both
top–down and bottom–up processing. This could lead one to
conclude that whereas simple stimuli involve mostly bottom–
up processes, complex (speech) stimuli involve both top–down
and bottom–up processes. Upon closer inspection, however, this
is probably overly simplistic. For example, by using a binocular
rivalry paradigm that consisted of a visual stimulus containing
looming motion presented to one eye, and radial motion to the
other, van Ee et al. (2009) demonstrated that participants were
able to hold on to one of the two percepts longer by means
of attention. Interestingly, this attentional gain for one of the
percepts was prolonged when the attended visual stimulus was
accompanied by a sound that matched the temporal character-
istics of the attended visual stimulus (Figure 2). This pattern
of results also suggests a complex interaction between attention
and multisensory integration. Although the exact neural mech-
anisms involved in this process are not yet fully understood,
it appears that attention boosts the neural response to one of
the competing visual signals, and that this boost, in turn, facili-
tates integration with the matching auditory signal. This ﬁnding
suggests that rhythmic congruence between visual and auditory
stimuli is another critical principle for multisensory process-
ing. Interestingly, van Ee et al. (2009) also demonstrated that
the mere presence of such a matched sound was insuﬃcient.
Instead, attention to both the visual and auditory modalities
was needed to facilitate attentional facilitation of one of the two
percepts. This result shows that multisensory interactions can
inﬂuence visual awareness, but only in interaction with attention,
underscoring that attention plays a pivotal role in multisensory
processing.
A Multisensory Representation
The evidence discussed so far shows that information from our
various senses fuses at several stages of processing. Additionally,
several studies show that multisensory speech processing can be
aﬀected by prior experience (Vroomen and Baart, 2009; Navarra
et al., 2010; Vroomen and Stekelenburg, 2011; Nahorna et al.,
2012). The next question is whether the inﬂuence of prior experi-
ence is limited to speciﬁc forms of speech processing or whether
it can be generalized across multiple domains of multisensory
processing.
Prior Experience and Multisensory
Memories
Thelen et al. (2012) have provided evidence for the role of
memory in the formation of a multisensory representation. In
this study, participants were required to memorize visual line
drawings. These drawings were either presented simultaneously
with a meaningless sound (multisensory context), or in isola-
tion (unisensory context). One of the key ﬁndings of this study
was that recognition accuracy was signiﬁcantly impaired when
the pictures had initially been presented in a multisensory con-
text. This result suggests that the multisensory context provided
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FIGURE 2 | Effects of attention and multisensory integration on conflict
resolving in binocular rivalry. (A) Experimental design: an object rotating at a
frequency of 0.6 Hz was presented to one eye, while a looming object,
expanding at a rate of 1 Hz, was presented to the other eye. Concurrent with
the presentation of these visual objects sounds could be presented, consisting
of, a stationary “e-chord” sound that was presented to one channel of a
headphone, while a looming sound that matched the temporal characteristics of
the looming object was presented to the other channel. Participants were
required to attend to the looming sound pattern and report when the dominant
visual pattern switched from the looming to the rotating image and vice-versa.
(B) Average durations of the looming (left) and rotating (right) visual patterns
being dominant. Duration times were significantly increased when participants
were requested to attend and hold on to one of the patterns. Importantly, when
the sound pattern was present this effect was enhanced for the (rhythmically
congruent) looming visual pattern, but not for the (rhythmically incongruent)
rotating visual pattern. These results suggest that attention can affect visual
dominance by way of interacting with congruent sound patterns (P, passive
viewing; H, hold on to instructed pattern). (C) Effects of rhythmic congruency
and attention. Experiments 1–4 tested the influence of sounds that were
consisted with the looming patterns. Experiments 1 and 3 show an increase in
attentional gain (i.e., a prolonging in duration of the held pattern) when a sound
was present that was rhythmically congruent with the held pattern. When the
sound was rhythmically incongruent (Experiment 2) a decrease in attentional
gain was observed, and when the sounds were unattended (Experiment 4) no
significant change in attentional gain could be observed. Experiment 5
generalizes the results to rotating visual patterns. Filled red circles indicate
attentional gains that significantly deviated from one. Adapted from van Ee et al.
(2009) by permission of the Society for Neuroscience.
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in the initial presentation has become part of the mental rep-
resentation. Thelen et al. (2015), subsequently manipulated the
semantic relation between the visual and auditory stimuli, and
also investigated the eﬀects of multisensory memory formation
on auditory processing. We found that auditory object discrimi-
nation was enhanced when initial presentations entailed seman-
tically congruent multisensory pairs, and impaired when they
entailed incongruent pairs, compared to sounds that had been
encountered only in a unisensory manner. This result shows that
the subsequent processing of a sensory trace is greatly aﬀected
by the initial context in which it was encoded. More speciﬁcally,
a congruent pair of audiovisual stimuli may facilitate subse-
quent recall, whereas incongruent, or unrelated auditory and
visual stimulus pairings may actually impair such recall. Thus,
an internally consistent multisensory stimulus may be remem-
beredmore eﬀectively than one that is internally inconsistent (see
also Molholm et al., 2007; Fiebelkorn et al., 2010 for evidence of a
similar role of learned multisensory associations in attention ori-
enting and; Quak et al., in revision for a literature review on the
relation between working memory and multsensory processing).
From a predictive coding perspective, semantically congru-
ent audiovisual stimuli will result in higher-order brain areas
receiving consistent information, which will result in a strong
and consistent internal model, and a low prediction error. If the
information presented is incongruent across modalities, this may
result in an inconsistency in the internal model, which in turn
may result in a greater error signal being sent back to the sensory
cortex, which in turn may result in more eﬀort being invested
in encoding the representation, combined with a weaker internal
representation.
Following the logic laid out by the predictive coding frame-
work, one would also expect that stimulating only one sensory
modality at the time will result in activation of another sensory
modality. If, for example, we only present a picture of the Swedish
Chef, our background knowledge may strongly aﬀect the internal
representation that we derive from this picture. Because his gib-
berish Swedish is such a characteristic feature, merely presenting
an image of themuppetmay not only activate our visual represen-
tation, it may also activate all concepts related to the SwedishChef
that we have gained through prior experience, including his char-
acteristic manner of speaking. Depending on how strong these
associations are, the image may not only trigger one’s knowledge
of the Chef ’s manner of speaking, it may even actively trigger
recall of speciﬁc fragments, such as those given in the examples
at the beginning of this article. Likewise, the presentation of a
speech fragment may trigger similarly vivid mental images of the
Chef ’s characteristic manners of behavior. In terms of predictive
coding, the internal representation would be activated because
the sensory input signal matches with an existing representation
stored in long-term memory. The resulting internal modal then
not only projects feedback information to the original sensory
cortex that activated the representation, but also to the other sen-
sory cortices. If this assumption is correct, then we might expect
that stimulating one sensory cortex, such as the visual one, might
also result in activation of other sensory cortices, such as the audi-
tory one. Next we turn to a number of studies that have provided
evidence for this.
Top–Down Induced Sensory Cortex
Activation via Mental Imagery
Evidence for the idea that visual cortex might be activated indi-
rectly by auditory stimuli comes from at least two diﬀerent
recent studies. Mercier et al. (2013) used intracranial record-
ings to show that auditory phase reset, and auditory evoked
potentials can be recorded in the visual cortex. This study thus
illustrates cross-sensory phase reset by a non-primary stimu-
lus in “unisensory” cortex. Vetter et al. (2014) used fMRI to
show that visual cortex was activated either by auditory stim-
uli, or by imagined stimuli. According to the Vetter et al. (2014).
study, sound is initially processed through the classical audi-
tory pathways. The resulting representation causes object-speciﬁc
neural activation patterns that are subsequently projected back
to visual cortex. Interestingly, sounds belonging to two diﬀer-
ent categories were correctly classiﬁed on the basis of the acti-
vation pattern observed in visual areas, regardless of whether
this pattern was induced by a physical sound or by a mental
imagery instruction, suggesting that higher-order cortical net-
works mediated the visual cortex activation. Vetter et al. (2014)
further compared the sound-induced activation patterns with the
imagery-induced activation in auditory cortex, but no similari-
ties were found here. Moreover, they compared activation across
diﬀerent exemplars and diﬀerent classes of stimuli and found
that the information projected back appears to convey higher-
level semantic information, as was shown using a multivariate
pattern analysis. Finally, they found similar activation in multi-
sensory convergence areas, including the precuneus and superior
temporal sulcus, suggesting that the visual cortex activation was
mainly induced by way of feedback from those multisensory
areas.
These results are compatible with recent studies by Berger and
Ehrsson (2013). These authors replicated two classical multisen-
sory integration eﬀects, but instead of presenting actual auditory
stimuli, they instructed their participants to imagine these stim-
uli. The cross-bounce illusion consists of two circles moving on a
collision course (Sekuler et al., 1997). Phenomenally, the two cir-
cles can either be perceived as crossing each other, after making
contact, or as bouncing oﬀ of each other. When a sound is pre-
sented at the moment of contact, participants tend to report more
often that two stimuli bounce instead of continuing on their orig-
inal course. Interestingly, Berger and Ehrsson (2013) showed that
these eﬀects could occur not only using actual auditory stimuli
but also using imagined ones, a result that is consistent with the
Vetter et al. (2014) conclusion that auditory imagery can aﬀect
visual processing. Similar results were also found for an imagined
version of the McGurk illusion.
In a second experiment, Berger and Ehrsson (2013) also
showed that visual imagery can aﬀect auditory processing. This
was done using an imagery version of the ventriloquist eﬀect.
The ventriloquist eﬀect describes how a sound can be mislocal-
ized because it coincides with a visual stimulus that is presented
at a diﬀerent location. In the imagery version of the ventriloquist
eﬀect, participants imagined the presence of a circle at a speciﬁc
location. Participants’ estimates of the location of sounds pre-
sented at nearby locations were systematically biased toward the
location of the imagined stimulus. In a subsequent fMRI study
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(Berger and Ehrsson, 2014), it was found that simultaneous visual
imagery and auditory stimulation resulted in an illusory translo-
cation of auditory stimuli that was associated with activity in the
left superior temporal sulcus, a key site for the integration of
real audiovisual stimuli (Driver and Noesselt, 2008; Ghazanfar
et al., 2008; Dahl et al., 2009; Beauchamp et al., 2010; Nath and
Beauchamp, 2012). These ﬁndings show that processing in brain
areas that we considered until recently to be unisensory can be
inﬂuenced by a variety of sources. This malleability of the sen-
sory cortices can possibly also explain why enhanced peripheral
visual processing can be observed in congenitally deaf partici-
pants (Scott et al., 2014). Scott et al. (2014) used fMRI to ﬁnd
that congenitally deaf patients show better peripheral vision, a
change that is presumably supported by a reorganized auditory
cortex. More speciﬁcally they found that this increase in periph-
eral vision related to changes in sensitivity in Herchl’s Gyrus,
as well as several other visual and multisensory areas, including
the posterior parietal cortex, frontal eye ﬁelds, anterior cingu-
lated cortex, and the supplementary eye ﬁelds. In addition to
the already established direct links between the sensory cortices
(Falchier et al., 2002; van den Brink et al., 2014), the results
discussed in the previous section show that one sensory cor-
tex can also activate another one via a slower route involving
higher cortical areas that provide feedback at a more abstract
level.
An Attentional Account of the
Multisensory Mind
We have seen that the cortical areas that until recently were
characterized as “unisensory” are far more interconnected than
previously thought possible. The ﬁnal question is how the inter-
play between all these connections can result in multisensory
integration.
According to the predictive coding framework, mental repre-
sentations of our external environment are actively constructed
by our higher-order brain processes (Friston, 2010), on the
basis of sensory input and our existing background knowl-
edge (Figure 3). Moreover, these mental representations serve
to form predictions about future changes in the external envi-
ronment so that sensory processing is optimized to predomi-
nantly deal with unexpected changes (Baess et al., 2011). Given
that backward connections might embody the causal structure
of the external world while forward connections only pro-
vide feedback about prediction errors to higher areas, it can
be argued that both types of connections are needed for inte-
gration. The higher-order brain areas containing the concep-
tual representation provide functional feedforward information
to the sensory cortices. Viewed this way, multisensory inte-
gration actually takes place because an attentional mechanism
combines the information contained in the existing mental rep-
resentation with general background knowledge and uses the
resulting model to update sensory processing, much in the
way that attention has been proposed to bind together sev-
eral stimulus feature within the visual modality (Treisman and
Gelade, 1980). Viewed this way, it can be tentatively stated that
FIGURE 3 | An attentional account of multisensory integration. Central
in this revised view of multisensory integration is the presence of a dynamic
mental representation, which is updated on the basis of sensory inputs as well
as on the basis of representations stored in memory. Shown here is an
example of how inaudible speech may benefit from both direct visual
stimulation, as well as from the context provided by prior exposure to a similar
situation. Processing in the visual and auditory sensory cortices is depending
on expectancies generated by the internal models. A mismatch between
expected input and actual input, formally known as a prediction error, may
result in enhanced activation in the sensory cortices. Multisensory integration
here is considered to consist of synchronization of activity in the auditory and
visual cortices. This integration is facilitated by direct and thalamo-cortical
connections between the auditory and visual cortical areas.
multisensory integration is largely accounted for by attentional
mechanisms.
Although this view actually places multisensory integration
again at the end of the processing stream from an anatomi-
cal perspective, it does not exclude the possibility of multisen-
sory interactions occurring early on in the processing stream.
A mismatch between the senses can, depending on the com-
plexity of the input stream, be resolved in the relatively early
stages of processing, presumably involving the aforementioned
direct or cortico-thalamo-cortical pathways. Presumably, the
processes involved here are mainly bottom–up. Although these
early sensory interactions may take place at early stages, it
should be noted that, following the logic of the predictive coding
framework, the individual sensory representations serve noth-
ing more than to update the internal model represented in
the higher-order brain areas. It is plausible that the individual
senses interact before they update our mental representation,
because reducing ambiguities in the individual input channels
will inevitably result in a reduction of prediction errors that
need to be fed-back to the sensory cortices. Although multisen-
sory interactions can thus take place early on in the processing
stream, their presence does not necessarily indicate multisensory
integration.
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Summary and Conclusion
Despite the initial idea that sensory information integrates
in higher-order association areas of the neocortex, substantial
amounts of evidence now point toward a much more diﬀuse
process, in which multisensory operations can take place at var-
ious stages of processing. Moreover, multisensory processes can
be aﬀected by a host of other cognitive processes, including
attention, memory, and prior experience.
More generally, this literature review has shown that mul-
tisensory processing and attention are strongly related to each
other. This brings us to the question whether the role of atten-
tion in multisensory integration is a matter of bottom–up or
top–down processing. Though speculative, I would argue that
while multisensory processing in general involves both bottom–
up and top–down processes, the more speciﬁc case of multi-
sensory integration is largely subserved by top–down processes:
From a predictive coding point of view, it can be argued that
integration takes place because higher-order networks actively
maintain a mental model of the environment, which generates
predictions about the expected sensory input. Sensory processing
itself is adjusted on the basis of the (dis)agreement, between the
actual sensory activity and the activity predicted by the model.
Moreover, this prediction error may also require an update of the
model itself. According to this view, it is in this mental model
where sight, sound, smell, taste, and touch is integrated with
our existing cognitive schemata. Several lines of evidence sup-
port this idea; early bottom–up driven processing in onemodality
can subsequently modify the internal representation of a stim-
ulus in another sensory modality (Busse et al., 2005; Van der
Burg et al., 2008, 2011), suggesting that functional feedback from
the sensory system results in a change in prediction of another
sensory modality. Additional inﬂuences from prior experience
(Vroomen and Baart, 2009; Thelen et al., 2012, 2015, or men-
tal imagery also actively aﬀect multisensory processing (Berger
and Ehrsson, 2013, 2014). Moreover, evidence exists to show that
such imagery can, just like actual sensory input, activate processes
in another modality (Vetter et al., 2014). Because the processes
that are involved in integrating the inputs from such a wide vari-
ety of sources are essentially top–down and bearing a strong
resemblance to attentional control mechanisms (van Atteveldt
et al., 2014), it can be argued that attention plays an essential
role in integrating information. Seen this way, attention counts
as an essential cognitive faculty in integrating information in the
multisensory mind.
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